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THE JONES TRESPASS DOCTRINE AND THE 




Each day that Houston drivers exit from Interstate 45 to drive 
to downtown Houston, they pass an odd sight.  Nestled within 
some bushes is an encampment of tents.1  This encampment is 
very clearly located on public property adjacent to the interstate 
highway,2 and equally clearly populated by homeless individuals.  
While local police ostensibly tolerate this presence, at least 
temporarily, the sight frequently evokes an image in my mind of 
a police search of those tents.  This thought is especially 
prominent on the days I am driving to my law school, South Texas 
College of Law Houston, to teach my federal criminal procedure 
course.3  
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in United States v. 
Jones,4 the hypothetical in my mind lead me to contemplate many 
factors that would inform the assessment of whether such police 
action would qualify as a search.  While there is no doubt police 
* Gary A. Kuiper Distinguished Professor of National Security Law, South Texas
College of Law Houston; Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired),  and formerly Special 
Assistant for Law of War Matters and Chief of the Law of War Branch, Office of the Judge 
Advocate General, United States Army; Chief of International Law for US Army Europe; 
Professor of International and National Security Law at the US Army Judge Advocate 
General’s School. A special note of thanks to my research assistant, Elizabeth Marx, South 
Texas College of Law Houston. 
1. GOOGLE MAPS, 29°46’05.9”N 95°21’52.1”W, [https://perma.cc/WT79-TJ6C] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2020); Eric Braate, Ask 2: Why Are There Growing Homeless Encampments 
Under Various Freeways in Our Area?, CLICK 2 HOUSTON (Jan. 27, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/9L29-CQVE]. 
2. Houston Map Viewer, CITY OF HOUSTON, [https://perma.cc/U9G6-N7PM] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2020) (located in the intersection of interstates 45 and 10). 
3. S. TEX. C. OF LAW HOUS., Geoffrey S. Corn, [https://perma.cc/SA4W-ZG7K] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2020). 
4. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
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would be “looking” for something, those familiar with Fourth 
Amendment analysis would be quick to recognize that “looking” 
does not ipso facto qualify as “searching” within the meaning of 
that Amendment.5  Instead, it would be necessary to analyze 
whether the police intruded upon what the Supreme Court labeled 
a reasonable or legitimate “expectation of privacy” when they 
were in the process of “looking.”6  And, pursuant to well-
established jurisprudence, this would, in turn, require assessing 
whether the individual who owned the tent manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy and whether that subjective 
expectation was one society recognized as legitimate or 
“reasonable.”7   
While the subjective prong of the assessment seems 
relatively straightforward in this hypothetical—the result of the 
individual shielding his possessions and activities within the tent 
from the public eye—the reasonableness of that expectation 
would be a more complicated question.8  Several factors suggest 
that an expectation of privacy in such a location is not one society 
would recognize as legitimate or reasonable, most notably the 
transient nature of the encampment coupled with the fact that it 
was emplaced near an interstate highway on public property 
ostensibly not designated for such encampments.9  
The Jones decision changed this search assessment 
equation.10  In Jones, the Supreme Court held that any physical 
trespass resulting from an investigatory motive against an 
individual’s “houses, papers, and effects”—items falling within 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s textual protections—
qualified as a search per se.11  As a result, any such trespass 
qualifies as a search and triggers the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness requirement, even in situations where before 
5. Id. at 408 n.5.
6. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 360-61.
8. Jeremy J. Justice, Do Residents of Multi-Unit Dwellings Have Fourth Amendment
Protections in Their Locked Common Area After Florida v. Jardines Established the 
Customary Invitation Standard?, 62 WAYNE L. REV. 305, 329 (2017). 
9. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (holding that an individual “may
not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields.”). 
10. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-06.
11. Id. at 404.
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Jones there would be no credible claim of a privacy expectation 
society was willing to recognize as legitimate or reasonable.12  
Thus, even when chattel property (an individual’s effect) is held 
out or exposed to the public, Jones indicated that the Fourth 
Amendment protects that effect from any police investigatory 
trespass, even one that does not qualify as a seizure.13  
Ensuring the Fourth Amendment extends to what it 
enumerates, as the Court indicated in Jones, is a logical minimum.  
But did the holding create its own illogic?  In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Alito indicated that the mere trespass on Jones’ 
vehicle was not, standing alone, sufficient to qualify as a search.14  
For Justice Alito, it was the violations of respondent’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy resulting from the long-duration and 
pervasive monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.15  
Specifically, he noted, “[t]he Court’s theory seems to be that the 
concept of a search, as originally understood, comprehended any 
technical trespass that led to the gathering of evidence, but we 
know that this is incorrect.”16  Later, the concurrence noted the 
illogic of classifying a trivial trespass as a search: 
. . . the Court’s reasoning largely disregards what is really 
important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term 
tracking) and instead attaches great significance to 
something that most would view as relatively minor 
(attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that 
does not interfere in any way with the car’s operation). 
Attaching such an object is generally regarded as so trivial 
that it does not provide a basis for recovery under modern 
tort law.17 
The concurrence’s triviality criticism is arguably illustrated 
by the Sixth Circuit’s 2019 decision in Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 
holding that a parking meter enforcement officer’s “chalking” of 
a tire to monitor the time in a parking spot qualifies as a search.18  
Chalking a tire, like the hypothetical such as the one I contemplate 
12. Id. at 407.
13. See id. at 408-11.
14. Id. at 420-24 (Alito, J., concurring).
15. Jones, 565 U.S. at 419.
16. Id. at 420.
17. Id. at 424-25.
18. See Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2019).
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each time I pass by those tents, raise a valid question: has this 
resurrection of the Fourth Amendment trespass doctrine gone too 
far?  Did the Sixth Circuit Court strike the right balance of 
interests in Jones, or was the concurrence triviality concern valid? 
This Article will explore that question and argue that 
redefining the reasonable expectation of privacy test as one that 
is residual to the trespass test has opened the door for its own 
unreasonable results.  More specifically, this Article will propose 
that the illogical overbreadth criticized by the Jones concurrence 
will necessitate an expansion of qualifications to the resurrected 
trespass doctrine: the implied license exception and the non-
investigatory motive exception.  Part I of the Article will trace the 
demise and resurrection of the trespass doctrine, to include how 
that doctrine may evolve to address the difficult question of 
investigatory access to an individual’s information.19  Part II of 
the Article will outline the impact of subordinating the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard for assessing what is, or perhaps 
what is not a search, to the Jones trespass doctrine.20  Part III will 
address the potential expanding scope of the trespass doctrine and 
how this expansion will challenge the efficacy of law 
enforcement and national security investigations.21  Part IV will 
propose an approach for reconciling the logic of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy doctrine with the trespass doctrine that 
could mitigate what seems to be the almost illogical consequences 
of the current equation.22  
I. BOOTLEGGING, WIRETAPPING, AND
RESURRECTION OF THE PHYSICAL TRESPASS 
DOCTRINE   
Roy Olmstead, a former Lieutenant in the Seattle Police 
Department, built a bootlegging empire in the Pacific 
Northwest.23  His downfall came as the result of a federal 
19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. Daryl C. McClary, Olmstead, Roy (1886-1966), HISTORY LINK (Nov. 13, 2002),
[https://perma.cc/9P27-4EUZ]. 
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investigation that relied on wiretapping his phone.24  Indeed, 
although Olmstead was protected from the Seattle police force as 
the result of extensive bribery, federal agents relied heavily on 
this relatively modern surveillance technique.25  When Olmstead 
faced the consequences of that investigation—federal criminal 
prosecution—he revealed his belief that such surveillance ran 
afoul of the Fourth Amendment.26  Unfortunately for Olmstead, 
his downfall was the partial result of the Supreme Court’s 
ultimate decision contradicting this belief.27  This decision 
established the touchstone for assessing what qualifies as a Fourth 
Amendment search and influenced government authority to 
conduct surveillance without implicating the Fourth Amendment 
for decades.28  That opinion, Olmstead v. United States,29 upheld 
Olmstead’s conviction for various federal offenses related to his 
bootlegging activities.30  More specifically, the Court held that 
wiretapping his phone line did not implicate Olmstead’s Fourth 
Amendment rights, as none of that evidence was obtained by 
means of a search within the meaning of that Amendment.31  
Trespass, or the absence thereof, was critical to this decision; 
because the government never trespassed on Olmstead’s 
residence, and never seized any tangible property belonging to 
Olmstead, there was no search.32 
This decision established what came to be known as the 
“trespass” doctrine: a defendant seeking to exclude evidence was 
required to establish that government agents engaged in a 
physical trespass against his person, home, papers, or effects.33  In 
all other situations, police were therefore permitted to engage in 
substantial investigatory activities that did not qualify as searches 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.34  Even when 
24. Id.
25. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456-7 (1928).
26. McClary, supra note 24, at 5.
27. Id.
28. See generally Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
29. Id.
30. See id. at 469.
31. Id. at 466.
32. Id.
33. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
34. Id. at 465.
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doing so intruded into places individuals might expect were 
secure or private, the police action did not qualify as a search.35 
This all changed when the Court issued its landmark opinion 
in Katz v. United States.36  In that case, federal law enforcement 
agents utilized a listening device attached to the top of a public 
phone booth to listen to Katz as he conversed with another 
individual after closing the phone booth door and paying the toll 
for the use of the phone.37  Unsurprisingly, the agents did not seek 
a warrant to conduct this surveillance;38 why would they?  
Pursuant to the Olmstead trespass doctrine, the surveillance could 
not qualify as a Fourth Amendment search and was therefore not 
subject to the Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.39  Based 
on the conversations Katz had while in the phone booth, he was 
convicted for transmitting wagering information over interstate 
telephone lines and challenged the legality of the wiretap by 
asserting that the government surveillance intruded upon his zone 
of privacy.40 
After refining the issue slightly, the Supreme Court held that 
the Olmstead trespass doctrine provided an insufficient 
benchmark for the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.41  As 
the Court noted, the Fourth Amendment protected “people, not 
places.”42  More specifically, the Court held that the Amendment 
was intended to protect people in those places where they expect 
privacy.43  Olmstead, according to the Court in Katz, was 
insufficient to ensure such protection because it restricted the 
applicability of the Amendment to only those things and places 
enumerated in the Amendment’s text.44  
In his seminal concurring opinion, Justice Harlan added 
significant flesh to the bones of the majority opinion; his theory 
that true benchmark for Fourth Amendment applicability was 
35. Id.
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
37. Id. at 348.
38. See id. at 356.
39. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
40. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49.
41. Id. at 352-53.
42. Id. at 351.
43. See id. at 352.
44. Id. at 353.
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whether police surveillance intruded into an individual’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”45 More specifically, Harlan 
noted that:  
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”  The question, however, is what 
protection it affords to those people.  Generally, as here, the 
answer to that question requires reference to a “place.”  My 
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior 
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society 
is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”  Thus, a man’s 
home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects 
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes 
to the “plain view” of outsiders are not “protected” because 
no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.  On 
the other hand, conversations in the open would not be 
protected against being overheard, for the expectation of 
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.46  
Harlan then explained the significance of Katz’s efforts to 
shield the content of his conversation from the public, and why 
that was so significant for extending Fourth Amendment 
protection to a place which could not qualify as his “home” or 
“effect”: 
The critical fact in this case is that “[o]ne who occupies it, [a 
telephone booth] shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll 
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume” 
that his conversation is not being intercepted. . . . . The point 
is not that the booth is “accessible to the public” at other 
times, . . . but that it is a temporarily private place whose 
momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from 
intrusion are recognized as reasonable.47 
Harlan’s approach for assessing a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, triggering applicability of Fourth Amendment 
protections, was subsequently adopted by a majority of the Court 
in its holding in United States v. White.48  In that decision, the 
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 361.
47. Id. (citations omitted).
48. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971).
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Court rejected the assertion that police violated the Fourth 
Amendment when the police recorded White’s conversation with 
the consent of the other party to the conversation.49  Unlike Katz, 
because White had exposed the content of the conversation to a 
false friend, he assumed the risk that it would be made available 
to the government.50  But more significantly, the opinion 
reinforced the critical touchstone for assessing what qualified as 
a reasonable expectation of privacy: whether the “thing” subject 
to government surveillance had been voluntarily exposed to the 
public or other third parties.51 
This Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test was 
frequently criticized as circular.52  This is because the subjective 
expectation of privacy was inevitably assessed by applying an 
objective criterion: had the individual exposed the thing to the 
public?53  And the assessment of the objective reasonableness of 
a privacy expectation—the question of whether it was one society 
was willing to recognize as reasonable—was inherently 
subjective in nature: does the presiding judge believe it is an 
expectation society recognizes as legitimate?54 
Nonetheless, because Katz moved well beyond the trespass 
doctrine, Katz extended these protections to many areas that prior 
to the decision had been understood as falling outside the scope 
of the Amendment.55  For example, subsequent to Katz, a Fourth 
Amendment search would occur if a police officer stood on the 
49. Id. at 751.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
53. See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002). 
54. Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An
Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1096 (1987) (“ . . . experience [has] 
shown the open-ended Katz test to be judicially unmanageable when applied to container 
searches.”); Colb, supra note 54, at 122-23 (critiquing the reasonable expectation of privacy 
doctrine as “unstable,” and suggesting that the Court must move towards an honest inquiring 
into “whether police have acted in a manner that exposes what would have remained hidden 
absent the transgression of a legal or social norm.”); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael 
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 29 (1988) 
(asserting that having a reasonable expectation of privacy standard means determining which 
expectations are reasonable, which has led the Court to “ . . . produce[] a series of 
inconsistent and bizarre results” that do not require the government to intervene when 
privacy values are at risk).  
55. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-40 (1979).
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toilet in a public bathroom stall to observe an individual in the 
adjacent stall.56  This is because by closing the door to the stall 
the individual demonstrated a subjected expectation of privacy, 
and it is an expectation the public considers legitimate.57  
Accordingly, such police surveillance would amount to an 
invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy, meaning a 
search.58 
But the Katz doctrine was a double-edged sword, for while 
it expanded the scope of Fourth Amendment protections to places 
and things not enumerated in the text of the Amendment, it also 
provided a relatively clear indication of what was not within the 
scope of the Amendment’s protections: namely, anything 
voluntarily exposed to the public.59  And, pursuant to the second 
prong of the Harlan test, even some things an individual sought 
to keep from the public eye fell outside the scope of the 
Amendment’s protections because a court concluded society was 
unwilling to recognize the expectation of privacy as legitimate.60  
Examples of the latter situation included the secret possession of 
illegal narcotics61 and the activities of an individual who 
unlawfully occupied someone else’s property.62 
Until 2012, the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test 
was generally understood as the exclusive method for assessing 
what qualified as a Fourth Amendment search.63  Indeed, in the 
56. United States v. White, 809 F.2d 1012, 1015 (8th Cir. 1985).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 749 (1971) (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)) (“ . . . for that 
amendment affords no protection to ‘a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom 
he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.’”); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 743-44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to the third parties.”).  
60. White, 401 U.S. at 749; Smith, 422 U.S. at 744-45; Miller v. United States, 425
U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (holding that a bank depositor has no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in “information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the 
ordinary course of business.”).   
61. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983).
62. People v. Antwine, 809 N.W.2d 439, 443 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
63. Christopher Totten & James Purdon, A Content Analysis of Post-Jones Federal
Appellate Cases: Implications of Jones for Fourth Amendment Search Law, 20 NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. 233, 234 (2017).
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2000 Supreme Court opinion Kyllo v. United States,64 none-other 
than Justice Scalia noted that, 
On the other hand, the antecedent question whether or not a 
Fourth Amendment “search” has occurred is not so simple 
under our precedent.  The permissibility of ordinary visual 
surveillance of a home used to be clear because, well into the 
20th century, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied 
to common-law trespass . . . .  We have since decoupled 
violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights from 
trespassory violation of his property . . . . 65 
Apparently, however, Justice Scalia’s assertion of a 
“decoupling” was overbroad, for in 2012, he would author the 
opinion that resurrected the Olmstead trespass doctrine: United 
States v. Jones.66 
In Jones, police placed a GPS tracking device on the 
undercarriage of Jones’ car so that they could track his 
movements over an extended period.67 Although they had 
originally obtained a warrant authorizing the placement, the 
warrant had expired when government agents actually put the 
GPS on the undercarriage of the car and began surveillance.68 
Jones moved to suppress the tracking records, asserting the nature 
and extent of the surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment.69 
The trial court, applying the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test, denied the motion except for a brief period of time 
when the car was in Jones’ garage.70  Jones was convicted and 
sentenced to life in prison.71 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the government 
argued, perhaps predictably, that neither the placement of the 
GPS device, nor the surveillance (with the exception of 
information obtained while the car was in the garage with the door 
closed), intruded upon Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy, 
64. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
65. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
66. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012). 
67. Id. at 402-03.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 403.
70. Id.
71. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
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and therefore never qualified as a search.72 Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion acknowledged as much.73  However, the Court 
then substantially recast the relationship between the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine and the physical 
trespass doctrine, with no reference to Justice Scalia’s assertion 
in Kyllo that the Court had “decoupled” Fourth Amendment 
analysis from physical trespass.74  Specifically, the Court noted 
that, 
The Government contends that the Harlan standard shows 
that no search occurred here, since Jones had no “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in the area of the Jeep accessed by 
Government agents (its underbody) and in the locations of 
the Jeep on the public roads, which were visible to all.  But 
we need not address the Government’s contentions, because 
Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with 
the Katz formulation.  At bottom, we must “assur[e] 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government 
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.” . . . . As explained, for most of our history the 
Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular 
concern for government trespass upon the areas (“persons, 
houses, papers, and effects”) it enumerates. Katz did not 
repudiate that understanding.75  
Because government agents physically trespassed on Jones’ 
car—his chattel property—to emplace the GPS device, the Court 
held that the government conducted a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.76 And, as reflected in the prior 
passage, it was irrelevant that the property was exposed to the 
public; the trespass on an item enumerated in the Fourth 
Amendment amounted to a search per se with no need to assess 
whether the government intruded upon a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.77  Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion suggested 
the nature of technology might necessitate reconsideration of the 
“exposure to the public” touchstone for assessing when an 
72. Id. at 406.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 406-09; Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).
75. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406-07 (footnote omitted) (internal citation to Kyllo omitted).
76. Id. at 404.
77. Id. at 404-07.
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individual loses an expectation of privacy.78 But she clearly 
agreed with the majority conclusion that the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test is a supplement to, and not a substitute 
for, the physical trespass doctrine.  Indeed, her opinion reinforced 
the Court’s holding when she noted: 
I agree that a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment occurs, at a minimum, “[w]here, as here, the 
Government obtains information by physically intruding on 
a constitutionally protected area.” . . . .  In this case, the 
Government installed a Global Positioning System (GPS) 
tracking device on respondent Antoine Jones’ Jeep without 
a valid warrant and without Jones’ consent, then used that 
device to monitor the Jeep’s movements over the course of 
four weeks.  The Government usurped Jones’ property for 
the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, thereby 
invading privacy interests long afforded, and undoubtedly 
entitled to, Fourth Amendment protection.79 
One of the Court’s justifications for resurrecting this trespass 
doctrine was simplicity; that unlike the circular and less 
predictable Katz reasonable expectation of privacy approach, a 
simple assessment of the status of the item and the existence of 
physical trespass would indicate a search.80  It may indeed be 
quite simple to determine when government agents engage in a 
physical trespass.81  But while the Jones opinion seems to indicate 
that any such trespass qualifies as a search, analysis may not 
actually be so simple.  This is because of an additional condition 
indicated in an important footnote in the Jones opinion,82 and a 
subsequent qualification established in the Court’s first 
opportunity to apply the resurrected trespass doctrine.83  Taken 
together, this may open the door to outcomes that may tend to 
align with the reasonable expectation of privacy assessment that 
the trespass doctrine was intended to supersede. 
78. Id. at 415-16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 413-14 (citation omitted).
80. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-06, 412.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 408 n.5.
83. See infra Part III.
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II. FOOTNOTE 5 AND THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
INVESTIGATORY MOTIVE? 
In footnote 5 of the Jones opinion, the Court appears to have 
added an additional requirement for a physical trespass to qualify 
as a search: what is best understood as an investigatory motive.84 
Specifically, the Court noted that, 
The concurrence notes that post-Katz we have explained that 
“‘an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
establish a constitutional violation.’”  . . . .  That is 
undoubtedly true, and undoubtedly irrelevant. . . . Trespass 
alone does not qualify, but there must be conjoined with that 
what was present here: an attempt to find something or to 
obtain information.85 
That such an investigatory motive is an essential requirement 
for treating a “textual trespass” as a search is reflected in the Sixth 
Circuit’s Taylor opinion, which concluded that, “[u]nder Jones, 
when governmental invasions are accompanied by physical 
intrusions, a search occurs when the government: (1) trespasses 
upon a constitutionally protected area, (2) to obtain 
information.”86  The court then emphasized that trespass alone 
was insufficient to find a Fourth Amendment search, and that, 
“once we determine the government has trespassed upon a 
constitutionally protected area, we must then determine whether 
the trespass was ‘conjoined with . . . an attempt to find something 
or to obtain information.’”87  
As the Sixth Circuit recognized, not all textual trespasses are 
motivated by an effort to find or discover information.88  As a 
result, this investigatory motive requirement means that some 
physical trespasses are excluded from the scope of the Jones 
trespass doctrine because they were not the result of such a 
motive.89  But this also raises a difficult question:  if motive is an 
essential element of the Jones trespass test, does this mean the 
84. Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5.
85. Id. (second emphasis added) (citations omitted).
86. Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Jones, 565
U.S. at 404-05). 
87. Id. at 333.
88. Id. at 332-33.
89. Id.
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subjective intent of the officer becomes dispositive?  Such an 
approach to assessing whether police engaged in a Fourth 
Amendment search would be fundamentally inconsistent with the 
thread that runs through almost all Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence:  compliance with the Amendment is based on an 
objective standard.90 Accordingly, what this element almost 
certainly requires is an objective motive assessment.91 
This is exactly how the Sixth Circuit addressed this element 
in Taylor, concluding that: 
Neither party disputes that the City uses the chalk marks for 
the purpose of identifying vehicles that have been parked in 
the same location for a certain period of time.  That 
information is then used by the City to issue citations.  As 
the district court aptly noted, “[d]espite the low-tech nature 
of the investigative technique . . . , the chalk marks clearly 
provided information to Hoskins.”  This practice amounts to 
an attempt to obtain information under Jones.92 
But how should this element be assessed in situations where 
the government does dispute the motive for the trespass, or where 
the motive is not nearly as objectively obvious?  For example, 
imagine a police officer walks up to the door of a home, in 
response to a 911 call, picks up an item blocking the walkway, 
only to realize after the trespass that the item is contraband or 
evidence.  Would such a trespass qualify as a search? Or perhaps 
after entering the home in response to a domestic violence call, 
an officer picks up a baseball bat lying on the floor simply to 
secure the scene and protect her safety, only to subsequently 
observe blood on the bat. Would that qualify as a search? 
Unfortunately, what qualifies as an investigatory motive is 
far from clear, and Jones offered no criteria for assessing this 
question.  Sheer logic suggests that most police efforts to “look” 
for something would result from an investigatory motive, with 
perhaps only incidental discovery of evidence falling outside that 
category of police discoveries.  But what if, as in the examples 
above, the discovery was incidental to a broader investigatory 
effort?  Nor did Jones provide any guidance on whether such an 
90. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1973).
91. See id. at 236 n.7.
92. Taylor, 922 F.3d at 333.
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investigatory motive must be linked to the discovery of evidence 
related to a criminal investigation.93  So where should courts look 
for guidance to resolve this question? One logical answer would 
be to look to one theory of exemption from the normal 
warrant/probable cause requirement that predated Jones—the 
community caretaking doctrine—and one that followed close on 
the heels of Jones, the implied license exemption.94  While there 
may be other situations where it is possible to conclude a trespass 
was not the product of an investigatory motive, these two 
exemption theories provide a logical starting point to better align 
the Jones holding with Justice Alito’s overbreadth concern.95
The community caretaking doctrine treats a search as 
reasonable if the primary motive is to protect the public from 
some danger as opposed to discovery of evidence.96  A similar 
rationale allows police to invoke exigent circumstances to 
conduct a warrantless entry of a home when they reasonably 
believe that some non-criminal threat endangers the occupants 
and the person is in need of immediate aid.97  Accordingly, the 
essential distinction between these warrantless searches without 
probable cause and those subject to the normal warrant/probable 
cause requirement is the motive for the search.98  It is logical to 
assume that these exceptions survive the resurrection of the 
93. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 n.5 (2012) (Justice Scalia does not
provide that the motive must be linked). 
94. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (establishing an exception to
the warrant requirement when a search is executed for the purpose of keeping the community 
safe and not motivated by a criminal investigation); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-10 
(2013) (establishing an exception to the warrant requirement when a government actor is 
granted an implied license to enter, depending upon the purpose for the entry).  
95. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United
States v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1, 10-11, 59-62 (2012); Cady, 413 
U.S. at 441 (noting there are times when a police officer may approach a car for purposes 
other than to investigate a violation of criminal statute); Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8 (indicating 
an officer may approach a front door of a home just as a visitor might do consistent with 
implied social license).  
96. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 447-48 (1973) (holding that the warrantless search of an
automobile impounded by police pursuant to an administrative inventory regulation was 
reasonable because it was standard police procedure to prevent something dangerous in the 
automobile from falling into the wrong hands).   
97. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).
98. See Gregory T. Helding, Stop Hammering Fourth Amendment Rights: Reshaping
the Community Caretaking Exception With the Physical Intrusion Standard, 97 MARQ. L. 
REV. 123, 139 (2013); Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10.  
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trespass doctrine precisely because their applicability indicates 
the absence of the second element of the Jones trespass doctrine: 
the investigatory motive.  Indeed, in Taylor, although rejected by 
the Sixth Circuit, the government invoked the community 
caretaking doctrine in an effort to exempt tire chalking from a 
Jones trespass.99  According to the court: 
Taylor argues that the search was unreasonable because the 
City fails to establish an exception to the warrant 
requirement.  Specifically, Taylor argues that the search at 
issue is not covered by the community caretaker exception 
and that the City fails to establish that any other exception 
applies to their warrantless search.  The City responds that, 
even if chalking is a search under Jones, the search was 
reasonable because there is a reduced expectation of privacy 
in an automobile.  The City further contends that the search 
was subject to the community caretaker exception.  We 
disagree with the City.100 
The opinion suggests that if the government had been able to 
persuade the Sixth Circuit Court that the chalking was in fact an 
exercise of community caretaking, it would have been treated as 
reasonable.101  But if that reasonableness turns on the conclusion 
that the police were not motivated by a desire to discover 
information or evidence related to criminal activity, then perhaps 
the better approach is to simply treat such trespass as falling 
outside the scope of a trespass search. 
The community caretaking exception is based primarily on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Cady v. Dombrowski.102  That 
case involved the inventory search of a vehicle impounded by 
police after it was involved in an accident.103  The vehicle was 
owned by a police officer, and the specific motivation for the 
search of the vehicle was to ensure that the officer’s service 
revolver was not left unsecured.104  The Court concluded the 
warrantless search of the vehicle was reasonable and that bloody 
items found in the trunk while the officer was looking for a 
99. Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2019).
100. Id. at 333-34.
101. Id. at 336.
102. Id. at 335; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
103. Cady, 413 U.S. at 435-437.
104. Id.
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service revolver were therefore admissible against Dombrowski 
when he was subsequently tried for the murder of his brother.105  
According to the Court, “[l]ocal police officers . . . frequently 
investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of 
criminal liability and engage in what . . . may be described as 
community caretaking functions . . . .”106  This indicates that 
when exercising a community caretaking function, compliance 
with the Fourth Amendment is assessed pursuant to a more 
flexible test for reasonableness; and that a public safety 
motivation for the search is what distinguishes an ‘evidence’ 
search from a community caretaking search.107  
Cady’s more flexible test for assessing reasonableness and 
the accordant compliance with the Fourth Amendment is, of 
course, predicated on the assumption that the police action 
qualified as a search.108  Nothing in the opinion suggested that a 
community caretaking motive indicated that there was no 
search.109  But Jones seems to open the door to questioning this 
underlying assumption.110  By making an investigatory motive an 
essential element for a trespass to qualify as a search, might a 
community caretaking motive fall outside the scope of that 
definition?  This would seem to be a logical interpretation of 
Jones if what the Court meant was that police must be motivated 
to find evidence, or something related to a criminal investigation.  
In contrast, a broad reading of Jones would result in the 
conclusion that an investigatory motive is established whenever 
police are looking for something, even when they are not doing 
so as part of a criminal investigation.  
It is clear that the community caretaking doctrine impacts the 
assessment of reasonableness, not whether police engage in a 
search,111 which makes it notable that Jones made no reference to 
105. Id. at 449-50.
106. Id. at 441.
107. Taylor, 922 F.3d at 335.
108. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 439, 442.
109. Id. at 441-42, 446-48.
110. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 n.5 (2012).
111. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 433 (basing the decision on whether or not the search was
reasonable, rather than being based on if there was a search); Jones, 565 U.S. at 400 (basing 
the decision on whether or not a search had occurred).  
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Cady or the community caretaking doctrine.112  This suggests that 
the Jones Court did not perceive its opinion as altering that 
doctrine,113 but also supports the assumption that such searches 
were conducted pursuant to ‘investigatory motive’.  This same 
assumption would also reach the emergency aid exception, as 
invocation of that exception is predicated on a reasonable belief 
that someone is in danger.114  Thus, both situations police will 
always be looking for something, albeit not evidence of a crime.  
But it is significant that such a broad interpretation of 
investigatory motive will inevitably expand the range of police 
actions that qualify as searches within the meaning of the Jones 
trespass doctrine.115  As a result, Jones may have set the 
conditions for an accordant expansion of the underlying rationale 
of the community caretaking and emergency aid exceptions and 
adoption of an accordant more flexible assessment of 
reasonableness.116  In other words, the overbreadth central to 
Justice Alito’s concern in Jones may inevitably be offset by a 
broadening of situations where warrantless trespass searches are 
assessed by balancing the nature of the trespass with the weight 
of the government interest.117  Expanding this balancing approach 
to assessing Fourth Amendment compliance seems most logical 
when the “something” police are looking for is minimally related 
to a criminal investigatory motive.118
 Assessing compliance with the Fourth Amendment for 
searches motivated by an interest other than general crime control 
pursuant to a flexible test of reasonableness has been a feature of 
Fourth Amendment doctrine since the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Camara v. Municipal Court.119  That decision held that such 
“administrative searches” fall within the Amendment’s scope, but 
112. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
113. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 400 (basing the decision on whether or not a search had
occurred); Cady, 413 U.S. at 433. 
114. Helding, supra note 101, at 135.
115. See id. at 163-64.
116. See id. at 134.
117. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 424-25 (Alito, J., concurring); Arcila, supra note 98, at 67;
see also  Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) (applying a balancing test to 
determine if a warrantless administrative search was proper). 
118. See Arcila, supra note 98, at 67-68.
119. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35 (1967).
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because of the motives for the search do not require a warrant 
based on probable cause to be reasonable.120  Instead, Camara121 
and its progeny allow for a balancing of individual and 
government interests in assessing what qualifies as reasonable in 
this context.122  But like the community caretaking exception, 
Jones opens the door to arguments that a non-criminal 
investigatory motive for administrative searches fall outside the 
scope of the trespass doctrine, ostensibly qualified by footnote 5 
of that opinion.123
If an investigatory motive is relevant exclusively to the 
assessment of what qualifies as a search, then arguably coupling 
a textual trespass with an effort to find anything produces a binary 
outcome.124  As a result, the investigatory motive element of 
Jones would dictate characterizing the activity as a search, but 
would play no role in assessing the reasonableness of the 
search.125  However, Jones may have produced an ironic effect: 
the need to place greater emphasis on the nature of the 
investigatory motive in order to offset an illogical textual trespass 
overbreadth.126  Why would this be ironic?  Because in seeking to 
simplify the assessment of what qualifies as a search, Jones has 
arguably necessitated expansion of the type of searches falling 
outside the scope of the normal warrant/probable cause 
requirement but instead subject to a balancing test assessment of 
reasonableness that defined the Katz search assessment the Court 
relegated to a secondary role.127  
As Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Jones warned, 
characterizing a trivial trespass as a search even where police act 
pursuant to a criminal investigatory motive risks illogical 
120. Id.
121. Id. at 538-39.
122. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 601-03 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). 
123. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 n.5 (2012).
124. See Gerald S. Reamey, Constitutional Shapeshifting: Giving the Fourth
Amendment Substance in the Technology Driven World of Criminal Investigation, 14 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 230-31 (2018).
125. Id. at 234, 240.
126. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 412-13.
127. See Reamey, supra note 125, at 235-36 (explaining that Jones complicated what
the Katz test could have resolved). 
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results.128  Indeed, tire chalking seems like an ideal example of 
this concern.  Of course, the overbreadth that triggered Justice 
Alito’s concern resulted not simply from treating the trespass as 
a search, but from the accordant exclusion of the evidence 
discovered as a result of the trespass.129  Where the motive for the 
trespass is unrelated to a criminal investigatory interest, this 
overbreadth seems even more apparent.  However, if nature of the 
investigatory motive were considered not to only to assess 
whether the trespass was a search, but also whether the search was 
reasonable under the objective circumstances, it would produce a 
different exclusionary result where what the “something” police 
were looking for was unrelated to a criminal investigation.130
This would allow the government to use evidence discovered as 
the result of such a trespass precisely because the objective facts 
indicated that police were not seeking to discover that 
evidence.131 
Consider the example of individuals compelled to live in a 
transient tent encampment. Whether searching such tents—
whether to prevent misuse of government property or to check on 
the health of the occupants—falls within the scope of one of the 
established exceptions to the warrant and probable cause 
requirements is unclear.  A restrictive reading of those exceptions 
would suggest such a search should be assessed no differently 
than a search related to a criminal investigation.132  But if the 
motive for such a search is objectively unrelated to the discovery 
of evidence, it would support a more expansive application of 
these exceptions and the balancing of interests upon which they 
are based.133  As a result, Jones would dictate that the trespass on 
the tent qualifies as a search, but any contraband discovered as a 
result would fall outside the scope of the exclusionary rule.134
128. Jones, 565 U.S. at 424-425 (Alito, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. See Reamey, supra note 125, at 229-30.
131. Id. at 240.
132. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 371-72 (1959); see also Carrie Leonetti,
Motive and Suspicion: Florida v. Jardines and the Constitutional Right to Protection from 
Suspicionless Dragnet Investigations, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 247, 250 n.16. (2016).   
133. See Leonetti, supra note 133, at 250 n.16.
134. U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
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Nor would a focus on the trespass motive necessarily 
conflict with the Court’s consistent rejection of focusing on an 
officer’s subjective state of mind when assessing Fourth 
Amendment compliance.135  Motive may very well be a 
subjective concept, but as in other contexts of the Fourth 
Amendment, it is always been assessed objectively.136  Implicit in 
Jones is the assumption that courts will assess the existence of an 
investigatory motive by considering the objective facts and 
circumstances.137  There is no reason why that assessment cannot 
include not only whether police were looking for “something,” 
but also why they were looking.  Indeed, this type of objective 
assessment of motive is already central to the applicability of the 
community caretaking and administrative search exceptions.138
Ultimately, it is unlikely the Court would endorse limiting 
the Jones trespass search to only those trespasses coupled with a 
criminal investigatory motive.139  What seems more likely is the 
Court’s willingness to accept an expansion of the balancing 
approach central to the community caretaking and administrative 
search doctrines to assess compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment where the police trespass is motivated by a non-
criminal investigatory motive.140  Nonetheless, the Court’s 
emphasis in footnote 5141 on the investigatory motive should be 
clarified in the context of the existing non-criminal search 
jurisprudence. 
135. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 736 (2011). 
136. See Reamey, supra note 125, at 228-29.
137. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 407-08.
138. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable-
cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); see Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260 (2007) 
(discussing how the California State Supreme Court shifted the objectively manifested intent 
of an officer during a traffic stop to a subjective intent test, which the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly rejected attempts of introductions of subjectivity into Fourth Amendment 
analysis); see Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (following Whren in determining 
the legal justifications for a police officer’s actions do not invalidate the action taken so long 
as the circumstances, when viewed objectively, justify the action taken). 
139. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5 (the majority does not limits that it must be a
criminal investigatory motive, but merely a motive to find something). 
140. See Reamey, supra note 125, at 230.
141. Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5.
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III. COULD “IMPLIED LICENSE” EXTEND TO
CHATTEL EFFECTS? 
Shortly after the resurrection of the trespass doctrine 
resulting from the Court’s decision in Jones the Supreme Court 
decided Florida v. Jardines.142  In that case, police suspected 
Jardines of growing marijuana in his home.143  As part of the 
investigation, police brought a dog trained to detect narcotics onto 
Jardines’ front porch.144  According to the opinion, 
As the dog approached Jardines’ front porch, he apparently 
sensed one of the odors he had been trained to detect, and 
began energetically exploring the area for the strongest point 
source of that odor.  As Detective Bartelt explained, the dog 
“began tracking that airborne odor by . . . tracking back and 
forth,” engaging in what is called “bracketing,” “back and 
forth, back and forth.” . . . .  Detective Bartelt gave the dog 
“the full six feet of the leash plus whatever safe distance [he 
could] give him” to do this—he testified that he needed to 
give the dog “as much distance as I can.” . . . .  After sniffing 
the base of the front door, the dog sat, which is the trained 
behavior upon discovering the odor’s strongest point. 
Detective Bartelt then pulled the dog away from the door and 
returned to his vehicle.  He left the scene after informing 
Detective Pedraja that there had been a positive alert for 
narcotics.145 
Based on this alert, police obtained a warrant to search the 
home, which resulted in the discovery and seizure of marijuana 
plants.146
Building on Jones, the outcome of the case seemed 
deceptively simple: because a police officer trespassed on the 
suspect’s home with an investigatory motive, it was an obvious 
search.147  Indeed, the Supreme Court held as such.148  And, 
because there was no lawful justification for doing so, the fruit 
that ultimately grew from that “poison tree”—the narcotics 
142. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
143. Id. at 3.
144. Id. at 3-4.
145. Id. at 4.
146. Id.
147. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5-6.
148. Id. at 11.
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discovered pursuant to the warrant—was inadmissible.149
However, the Court introduced a new component to the Jones 
trespass analysis: the potential impact of police acting within the 
scope of express or implied social license.150  While ultimately 
rejecting the Government’s argument that this is what actually 
occurred, the decision created the first qualification to Jones: a 
trespass will not qualify as a search when police act within the 
scope of such social license.151 
This issue arose in response to the assertion that the officer 
who brought the dog to Jardines’ porch did nothing more than any 
other neighbor might do when he entered the curtilage and went 
to the front porch.152  Accordingly, the Court noted that, “[s]ince 
the officers’ investigation took place in a constitutionally 
protected area, we turn to the question [of] whether it was 
accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion.”153 This 
emphasis on the “unlicensed” physical intrusion seems to indicate 
an exception to the Jones trespass rule: a trespass will not qualify 
as a Fourth Amendment search if it is within the scope of 
customary license.154  More specifically, the Court noted that, 
As it is undisputed that the detectives had all four of their 
feet and all four of their companion’s firmly planted on the 
constitutionally protected extension of Jardines’ home, the 
only question is whether he had given his leave (even 
implicitly) for them to do so. He had not.  “A license may be 
implied from the habits of the country,” notwithstanding the 
“strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a 
close.” . . . .  We have accordingly recognized that “the 
knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or license 
to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by 
solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.” . . . .  This 
implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the 
home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be 
received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.  
Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does 
not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally 
149. See id. at 11-12.
150. Id. at 8-10.
151. Id. at 9-10.
152. Jardines 569 U.S. at 8.
153. Id. at 7.
154. Id. at 7-8.
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managed without incident by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and 
trick-or-treaters.155 
As noted above, this qualification to the trespass doctrine 
proved of no value to the Government as the Court concluded the 
police officer exceeded the scope of the implied license to 
approach the home.156  According to the Court, the officer did 
much more than what any other neighbor might do when he 
lingered on the porch and allowed his dog to dart back and forth 
in search of a scent.157  Nonetheless, by addressing this issue the 
Court created a new question: what exactly is a social license and 
when will it provide an exception to the Jones trespass 
doctrine?158 
It may be that this license exception to the Jones trespass 
doctrine is strictly limited to allow police to approach the front 
door of a home, announce their presence, and wait a brief time for 
the occupant to respond.159  But it seems noteworthy that the 
Court began its analysis by indicating that the habits of the 
country may imply such license.160  Of course the “habit” the 
Court emphasized in Jardines was the habit of approaching the 
front door to ring the bell.161  But if the key question is societal 
“habit” that implicitly tolerates a limited trespass, it could extend 
well beyond the facts of Jardines.162 
Extending this notion of license beyond the facts of Jardines 
might enable the government to assert that some trespasses 
against an individual’s effects fall within the scope of an implied 
license exception.163  But, ironically, this might also inject the 
same type of “legitimate expectation of privacy” analysis into the 
search equation that Jones ostensibly superseded.  This is because 
the license could prove to be a proverbial back door to concluding 
society tolerates the trespass because the individual exposed the 
155. Id. at 8 (internal citations omitted).
156. Id. at 5-6.
157. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9-10.




162. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8-9.
163. See id. at 9 nn.3-4; see id. at 19, 21 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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thing to routine and acceptable trespass.164  For example, in the 
Jardines case, had the officer confined his activity to the limits of 
the implied license discussed by the Court, the fact that the officer 
did no more than any other citizen was “licensed” to do would 
have exempted the trespass from the Fourth Amendment.165  This 
conclusion would have been predicated on the determination that 
the homeowner exposed the path to the front door of the home to 
any other member of the public, so long as the purpose was to 
ring the bell and wait a reasonable time for a response.166  While 
not framed in terms of expectations of privacy, it is interesting 
that this conclusion would turn on an analysis similar to that 
applied to determine when an expectation of privacy is or is not 
one society recognizes as legitimate.167 
This implied license concept may extend to other situations 
where police do in fact physically trespass on an individual’s 
effects, perhaps even where the police act pursuant to an 
investigatory motive.168  Imagine instead of squatting on public 
property, a homeowner awakes one morning to see an uninvited 
tent erected in her backyard. Police arrive and the property owner 
gives consent for them to check the tent and investigate why 
someone is trespassing on their property.  In so doing, the officer, 
after opening the tent, finds contraband inside in plain view.  Can 
the occupant of the tent—the individual who trespassed to pitch 
the tent—assert that by physically touching his tent with an 
investigatory motive police committed a Jones trespass, 
subjecting the contraband to Fourth Amendment based 
exclusion?  Such an assertion seems absurd; one that would 
certainly fail under pre-Jones reasonable expectation of privacy 
analysis.  But because Jones indicates that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test is secondary to the textual trespass test, 
164. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 21 (Alito, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 9 (majority opinion) (holding that a citizen is implied to have license to
merely knock on the front door but does not have license to “introduc[e] a trained police dog 
to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence[,]” nor 
“explor[e] the front path with a metal detector, or march[] his bloodhound into the garden 
before saying hello and asking permission . . . .”). 
166. See id. at 8; see id. at 17 (Alito, J., dissenting).
167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971). 
168. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 21 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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it suggests that this analysis may not be invoked to negate or 
dilute the textual minimum that led to the resurrection of that 
trespass doctrine. 
But, might an implied social license provide an alternative 
rationale for excluding such a physical trespass from the 
definition of a search?  Did the officer act within the scope of such 
a license based on the trespass to the homeowner’s property and 
the subsequent request for assistance?  Unless the concept of 
social license were extended to such a situation it is difficult to 
see how the physical trespass to the tent would not be a search 
within the meaning of Jones. 
Or, consider how an implied license might influence the 
assessment of the police activity addressed in Bond v. United 
States.169  In that case, the Supreme Court, applying the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test, held that the physical 
manipulation of a bus passenger’s bag placed on the overhead 
storage shelf constituted a Fourth Amendment search.170  The 
Government argued that by placing the bag on the overhead shelf, 
the passenger exposed it to public view and therefore had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy protecting the bag from police 
touching.171  The Court rejected this argument, noting that there 
is a material difference between visual observation (suggesting 
just looking at the bag would not have been a search) and the 
tactile inspection engaged in by the police officer.172 
The Court’s analysis in Bond seems aligned with Jones: it 
was the physical touching of the chattel property, coupled with an 
investigatory motive, that crossed the line from a non-search 
visual observation to a Fourth Amendment search.173  However, 
according to the opinion, “petitioner concedes that, by placing his 
bag in the overhead compartment, he could expect that it would 
169. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); see generally Jason W. Eldridge, The
Fourth Amendment: The Privacy of Overhead Luggage Compartments on Commercial 
Buses, 27 WM. MICHELL L. R. 2003, 2023-30 (2001) (discussing the Bond decision and the 
lack of criteria for determining a reasonable expectation of privacy for luggage in overhead 
compartments).  
170. Bond, 529 U.S. at 339.
171. Id. at 337.
172. Id. at 337-38.
173. Id. at 337-39.
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be exposed to certain kinds of touching and handling.”174  The 
Court then noted, 
When a bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he 
expects that other passengers or bus employees may move it 
for one reason or another.  Thus, a bus passenger clearly 
expects that his bag may be handled.  He does not expect that 
other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of 
course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner. 175 
Accordingly, it was not the touching per se that constituted 
the search, but instead a touching that extended to tactile 
manipulation that exceeded the expectation common to 
passengers who place bags in such a location.176 
Nothing in the Bond Court’s discussion focused on whether 
police touching would have been incidental or pursuant to an 
investigatory motive.177  Instead, the key consideration seems to 
have been whether the touching was or was not consistent with 
what the passenger would expect any other passenger to do while 
moving or adjusting the bag.178 But Jones suggests this distinction 
in the nature of the touching is now irrelevant.179  In contrast, 
Jardines may dictate an outcome aligned with Bond when 
assessing whether such a touching qualifies as a search by 
analyzing whether the nature or extent of the touching fell within 
the scope of social license, even assuming an investigatory 
motive.180  When a passenger places a bag on an overhead shelf 
on a bus, it is implicitly understood that other passengers may 
touch it to move it.181  Of course, there is no analogous 
implication that other passengers may manipulate it to search the 
contours of its contents, and hence what the officer did in Bond 
would not fall within the scope of a limited social license.182  But 
if all the officer does is touch the bag to move it, and as a result 
174. Id. at 338.
175. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39.
176. See id.
177. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39.
178. See id.
179. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05, 409-10 (2012).
180. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013).
181. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338.
182. Id. at 338-39.
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detects the presence of contraband, where would this detection 
fall within the Jones/Jardines continuum? 
This raises an important post-Jardines question: may an 
officer engage in such a physical trespass without implicating the 
Fourth Amendment?  Interestingly, the answer to this question 
may itself implicate the officer’s motive.  In the Bond context, 
this motive to discover evidence no matter the nature or extent of 
the touching may itself indicate the trespass is inconsistent with 
the social license applicable to other passengers; while they may 
touch a bag to move it, they are not doing so in the hopes of 
discovering something.183  But the same could have been said for 
the hypothetical officer in the Jardines analysis who did nothing 
more than enter upon the curtilage to approach the front door and 
ring the bell consistent with implied license as nothing in the 
Court’s discussion of such action turned on the motive for the 
police action.184  
Unfortunately, Jardines fails to provide clear guidance on 
whether an investigatory motive negates the applicability of the 
implied social license exemption.185  At one point in the opinion, 
the Court, citing Kentucky v. King, notes that, “a police officer not 
armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely 
because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do.’”186  
Ostensibly the officer is approaching and knocking because she 
seeks to investigate something.187  This suggests that even when 
acting pursuant to an investigatory motive, an officer acting 
within the scope of implied social license is not engaged in a 
Jones trespass search.188  However, later in the opinion the Court 
seems to indicate a contrary conclusion when it notes,  
[t]he scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not
only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.
Consent at a traffic stop to an officer’s checking out an
anonymous tip that there is a body in the trunk does not
permit the officer to rummage through the trunk for
narcotics.  Here, the background social norms that invite a
183. See id; see Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9.
184. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8.
185. See id. at 10.
186. Id. at 8; Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011).
187. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 22 (Alito, J. dissenting).
188. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9; King, 563 U.S. at 469.
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visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a 
search.189 
Thus, the motive for the trespass does seem central to 
assessing whether an officer is acting within the scope of implied 
social license, suggesting that the mere fact that a trespass is 
consistent with how other members of society might trespass is 
not dispositive on the question of whether the trespass is or is not 
exempted from the Jones doctrine.190  If an investigatory motive 
negates the implied license exemption, then any trespass no 
matter how trivial would qualify as a search.191 
But even this aspect of the opinion creates uncertainty 
because it is not clear what the Court means with the phrase “to 
conduct a search.”192  The facts of Jardines and the examples the 
Court provides (using a metal detector along the path to the front 
door or allowing a bloodhound to run through the flower bed 
adjacent to the front door193) suggest an effort to discover 
evidence.  Would this “motive” based nullification of social 
license apply when police were looking for something unrelated 
to a criminal investigation?  For example, what about the police 
in Boston going door to door in response to the Boston Marathon 
bombing?  Clearly these officers were looking for something—
the bombers or other related evidence; but they were not looking 
for evidence related to crimes committed by the homeowners.194
Imagine a homeowner opens the door and an officer observes 
contraband unrelated to the bombings; detains the homeowner 
while she obtains a warrant; and then seizes the evidence.  Will 
that evidence then be subject to exclusion as the result of a Jones 
trespass or will the social license exception apply? 
If implied social licenses are nullified only by a criminal 
investigatory motive, the Jardines decision might also be relevant 
to the legality of police inspections of indigent tent encampments. 
Might a court determine that police may act within implied 
189. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9.
190. See id. at 8-9; Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
191. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8-9.
192. Id. at 9.
193. Id.
194. Katy Waldman, Can the Police Search My Home for a Bomber?, SLATE (Apr. 19,
2013), [https://perma.cc/9T27-S6QN]. 
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license to physically trespass on an individual’s chattel property 
located in such an encampment?  Even if individuals reside in 
these tents, it is unlikely that the area immediately surrounding 
the tent would qualify as the curtilage of a home, especially where 
the tent is pitched on public property not designated for such 
use.195  As a result, police need not refrain from inspecting these 
public areas merely because individuals pitch their makeshift 
homesites on them.196  Furthermore, as the Court emphasized in 
Jardines, there is no requirement that police shield their eyes197 
from that which is observable from such vantage point. 
Accordingly, any information that becomes apparent to an officer 
while moving in and about such a homeless encampment would 
not be acquired as the result of a Fourth Amendment search. 
What becomes more problematic, however, is whether 
police may look inside the tents or other makeshift shelters, or 
whether they may remove the property from the public area. 
Either action would require a physical trespass to an individual’s 
effects. From the citizen’s perspective, such action would 
certainly qualify as a trespass on “effects” the moment the officer 
crossed the line from visual observation to physically touching.198
But would such physical trespass fall within the scope of social 
license allowing police to maintain the integrity of public 
property?199  If the issue of license relates to the implied authority 
of other residents, without consent, to enter someone else’s tent, 
the assertion would almost certainly fail.200  Indeed, one of the 
reasons individuals erect tents is to establish some level of privacy 
from others located in the same area. 
195. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6 (defining the curtilage as “the area ‘immediately
surrounding and associated with the home” which is part of the home itself for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180-81 (1984) 
(distinguishing that only the curtilage, not neighboring open fields, warrants Fourth 
Amendment protections that attach to the home).  
196. See Doyle Baker, Annotation, Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of
privacy in tent or campsite, 66 A.L.R.5th 373, § 4 (1999). 
197. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7.
198. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012).
199. Baker, supra note 197; People v. Thomas, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610, 613 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995). 
200. See generally Carrie Leonetti, The Wild, Wild West: The Right of the Unhoused
to Privacy in Their Encampments, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 399 (2019). 
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This hypothetical raises the complicated question of whether 
government agents act within the scope of implied license when 
inspecting public areas, especially when those areas are not 
intended for temporary residential use?  And because such police 
action may be motivated by a community caretaking function, the 
question of implied license becomes even more complex if motive 
contributes to the assessment of such license.  Certainly, securing 
the public from risks in public spaces is a central function of law 
enforcement agents.201  And, but-for the erection of these tents, 
there would be no restriction on the activities of such agents to 
inspect such areas.  Thus, if such license exists, it is not the 
product of implied consent from the occupant of the tent, but 
instead from the scope of traditional government authority to 
ensure the safety of public spaces.202 
There is very little in the way of jurisprudence indicating the 
parameters of such an implied license theory.203  Nonetheless, 
extending the Jardines implied license exception to such 
situations might produce a more rational balance of interests.204
This is especially true when the primary motive for the trespass is 
objectively unrelated to a criminal investigation and where the 
scope of any trespass is limited to a cursory observation to rule 
public safety risk.205  For example, imagine an officer seeking to 
check on the health of individuals in such an encampment during 
an unusual cold spell in Houston.  Unlike residents of most 
northern communities, Houston’s indigent population is generally 
poorly equipped to contend with below freezing temperatures.206
Is a police officer checking on the condition of tent occupants 
conducting a Fourth Amendment search?  Or is she acting within 
201. Mary Elisabeth Naumann, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another
Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 326 (1999). 
202. Id. at 339-40; see Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973).
203. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013) (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127,
136 (1922) (“A license may be implied by the habits of the country.”)).  But see Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)  (relying on Hester for the implied licenses rule but 
appeared to be more about “open fields” than the conditions producing an implied license). 
204. See supra Part II.
205. Castagna v. Jean, 955 F.3d 211, 220-21 (1st Cir. 2020).
206. Davis Land, As Cold Weather Continues, Advocates Keep Homeless In
Mind, HOUSTON PUBLIC MEDIA  (Nov. 14, 2018), [https://perma.cc/8RD6-2S9T]. 
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the scope of implied license to ensure the safety of individuals in 
public areas? 
The answer to this question would be decisive in assessing 
whether contraband incidentally discovered during such a ‘check’ 
would be admissible or subject to Fourth Amendment based 
exclusion.207 Of course, as noted above, treating such an 
inspection as a search would be the first step in assessing 
admissibility, and the community caretaking exception might 
then apply to render the search reasonable.208  But this predicate 
question of search is obviously important in order to decide 
whether such an exception is even required.  Still, even assuming 
arguendo that social license might exempt such inspections from 
the scope of the Jones trespass doctrine, it provides only a limited 
answer to the question posed herein.  This is because it would 
only apply to those situations where the police officer’s primary 
motive is distinct from discovery of evidence or contraband.209
And, as noted above, that alone may be sufficient to exclude such 
inspections from the trespass doctrine.210  But what if police do 
seek to discover evidence or contraband?  
IV. THE UNREASONABLE CONSEQUENCE OF AN
UNRESTRICTED TRESPASS DOCTRINE 
The Jones decision is overt in foreclosing the relevance of 
expectations of privacy in relation to police activity that qualifies 
as a textual Fourth Amendment trespass.  But is this outcome 
logical when an individual places chattel property in a location 
207. See MIL. R. EVID. 313(a); Of course, the interests of good order and discipline
that impact that exclusion of such inspections from the search category are absent in the 
homeless area context.  But the expectation that government actors take measures to ensure 
health and safety in each respective context is analogous.  In the military context, these 
inspections are not treated as searches for Fourth Amendment purposes (unless certain 
considerations suggest the inspection was a subterfuge for a probable cause search).  As a 
result, any contraband that comes into plain view during the course of such an inspection is 
considered admissible evidence in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, including trial by 
court-martial.  See MIL. R. EVID. 316(c). 
208. See Megan Pauline Marinos, Breaking and Entering or Community Caretaking?
A Solution to the Overbroad Expansion of the Inventory Search, 22 GEO. MASON U. CIV. 
RTS. L. J. 249, 289-90 (2012).  
209. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 n.5 (2012).
210. See supra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.
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where it seems objectively unreasonable to expect that the 
property is immune from such physical trespass?  Is it reasonable 
to vest such property with Fourth Amendment protection based 
solely on the fact that it qualifies as a personal effect?  Or might 
the inherent unreasonableness of the privacy expectation translate 
into a conclusion that police may act within implied license to 
trespass on the chattel property? 
While perhaps purely theoretical, it is nonetheless interesting 
to consider how the Court’s decision resurrecting the trespass 
doctrine seems to have been influenced by a perceived perversion 
of the reasonable expectation of privacy rational: the Court 
seemed to believe that a test adopted to expand protection from 
government surveillance actually evolved to deny protection 
provided by the Fourth Amendment’s text.211  Indeed, this was 
precisely the theory relied on by the Government in that case: 
because neither the placement of the GPS device on Jones’ car 
nor tracking his movements intruded upon a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the government asserted it did not qualify 
as a search.212  The Court categorically rejected this argument, 
concluding that the physical trespass on his “effect” was a 
search.213  And, by characterizing the reasonable expectation of 
privacy doctrine as a supplement, and not a substitute214 for the 
textual protections of the Amendment, the Court emphasized 
what it perceived was illogic: allowing the reasonable expectation 
test to open the door to conduct that runs afoul of the 
Amendment’s text.215 
But did Jones create its own illogic by providing protection 
against physical trespass of effects in situations where that 
protection seems objectively unjustified?  More specifically, is it 
logical to subject police to the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment when a physical trespass on an effect can, in no 
credible way, appear to invade a privacy expectation society 
would view as unacceptable?  For example, is it logical to impose 
Fourth Amendment constraints on police when the trespass is 
211. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406, 410-12.
212. Id. at 406, 410, 412.
213. Id. at 404.
214. Id. at 409.
215. See id. at 411 n.8.
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consistent with the type of trespass any other member of the 
public might commit?  Ideally the Jardines license concept216 will 
evolve to provide a solution to this potential overbreadth, which 
might also align with Justice Alito’s concerns that treating a 
trivial physical trespass to chattel property as a search, even if it 
reveals nothing.217   
Using the example of the trespasser who pitches his tent on 
someone else’s property, the illogic of treating a physical 
investigatory trespass on the tent as a search because an officer 
touches the trespasser’s effect seems self-evident.  Pursuant to the 
Jones trespass doctrine, the occupant of that tent may now assert 
Fourth Amendment protection, as may others whose chattel 
property is located in areas where there is really no reasonable 
justification to expect a privacy interest.218  And even assuming 
the officer is responding to a criminal trespass of the 
homeowner’s property, treating the touching of the tent as a 
search would mean the officer’s conduct is presumptively 
unreasonable, absent a warrant.219  In contrast, this illogical 
extension of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment would 
have been easily dispensed with, pursuant to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test.220  But according to Jones, this test 
becomes irrelevant the moment a trespass occurs on an 
individual’s chattel property.221  Perhaps the Jardines license 
concept222 will evolve to align the trespass doctrine with inherent 
logic.  At least such an evolution seems warranted by Justice 
Alito’s concerns about treating 
It is of course unremarkable that the Fourth Amendment 
limits law enforcement efforts to investigate crime and gather 
evidence; an inherent consequence of the Amendment from 
inception.223  But that consequence, and the exclusionary rule 
216. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2013).
217. Id. at 18 (Alito, J., dissenting).
218. See  Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (the officer would be touching the person’s effect).
219. Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 406-07 (majority opinion).
222. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2013).
223. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 933 n.4 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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created to ensure police compliance with the Amendment,224 has 
always been justified by the assumption that the liberty or privacy 
interest of the citizen outweighed the public’s interest in efficient 
law enforcement.  By extending the trespass doctrine to any 
textual trespass whenever motivated by an interest of finding 
something, the doctrine risks becoming attenuated from this 
rationale.225 
While Jones forecloses the possibility that the inherent 
unreasonableness of a privacy expectation should qualify the 
trespass doctrine. Yet it is ironic that if the Jardines implied 
license concept is expanded to apply to other situations, courts 
may be thrust into the same type of “expectation” assessment 
when seeking to assess the existence and scope of such license.226  
Indeed, this reasoning was inherent in the Jardines Court’s 
conclusion that there is no ‘reason’ to expect police will be 
restricted from approaching one’s front door to ring the bell 
because such activity falls within the scope of implied license.  
This conclusion was based on the Court’s assessment that an 
average member of the public implicitly consents to such activity, 
which in a sense is a backdoor determination that no person would 
consider such conduct an unreasonable invasion of privacy.227  In 
other words, assessment of implied social license may turn on an 
underlying assessment of the reasonableness of expecting other 
members of the public to do exactly what the police did, which 
certainly seems reminiscent of the expectation of privacy 
analysis.228 
Still, it is important to recognize that even if the Jardines 
implied license exception to the Jones trespass doctrine were to 
extend to other contexts, the burdens associated with any Fourth 
Amendment based litigation be materially different than the 
traditional expectation of privacy analysis.  Unlike the traditional 
Katz test, a defendant objecting to government surveillance would 
224. Id. at 918-19 (majority opinion); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-42
(2009) (“. . . [t]he exclusionary rule was crafted to curb police rather than judicial 
misconduct”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).  
225. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-05, 408 n.5.
226. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-9 n.2 (2013).
227. See id.
228. Id.
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have no burden to establish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.229  Instead, pursuant to Jones, any investigatory trespass 
directed against a textually protected interest would 
presumptively qualify as a Fourth Amendment search.230  Once 
that trespass is established, the government would then bear the 
burden of establishing that the trespass fell within the scope of an 
express or implied social license.231  While the existence of such 
license might be supported by evidence that few would expect the 
item to be immune from trespass (like a bag in a bus or airplane 
overhead), situations to which this social license theory would 
apply would ostensibly be far more limited than those in which 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.232  This is because 
merely exposing an item to public view would in no way justify 
the conclusion of such a license. Thus, the government would 
bear the burden of proving far more than the ability of any other 
member of the public to observe the item; they would have to 
prove that other members of the public were implicitly authorized 
to physically trespass on the effect in the same manner as did the 
government agent.233  As the Court’s decision in Bond indicates, 
even when assessing the reasonableness of an expectation of 
privacy, this is not easily satisfied.234  
The impact of such a qualification to the Jones trespass 
doctrine would concededly be limited mainly to an individual’s 
effects, and only when those effects were held out in a manner 
clearly within the scope of an implied license allowing limited 
trespass.235  This is because it is almost inconceivable that the 
229. See id. at 8.
230. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-05.
231. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8-9.
232. See id.; Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
233. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8-9; Bond, 529 U.S. at 338.  This would of course raise the
same type of objections of arbitrariness that have traditionally been leveled at the Katz test: 
that an ostensible “objective” standard is really nothing more than a subjective judicial 
assessment lacking any consistency.  But unlike the traditional Katz test, the weight of the 
presumptive protection of the textual interest would to a certain extent offset this risk. 
Furthermore, a demanding burden for rebuttal could be a component of this qualification.  
For example, only where the government establishes by clear and convincing evidence that 
the nature of the exposure of the “effect” or “paper” indicates an objectively unreasonable 
expectation of privacy would the protection be denied.  
234. Bond, 529 U.S. at 336-38.
235. Id. at 337.
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government could demonstrate an implied social license to 
trespass on the home or the curtilage of the home that extended 
beyond the limited license addressed in Jardines. Indeed, as the 
Court has noted, the home has always been regarded as, “the first 
among equals”236 for Fourth Amendment analysis.  This 
maximum or heightened status of the protected nature of the home 
was reinforced in the post-Jones decision in Collins v. Virginia.237  
In that case the Court rejected application of the auto exception to 
the warrant requirement as a justification to trespass upon the 
curtilage of a home to search a motorcycle.238 Instead, the Court 
held entering upon the curtilage to get to the motorcycle was a 
trespass search with no lawful authority. Thus, even when 
exposed to the public eye, a trespass onto the curtilage of the 
home to access effects qualifies as a search.239 
The facts of Jones also provide a useful example of how 
limited this qualification could be in practice.240  Unlike the 
motorcycle in Collins, the automobile in Jones, subjected to what 
the Court held was a Fourth Amendment “trespass” search, was 
at the time of the trespass located in a commercial parking lot.241  
Thus, approaching the automobile did not qualify as a search in 
that situation.242  However, the physical trespass required to place 
the GPS device on the undercarriage did.243  Nothing suggested 
herein would alter that conclusion.  This is because there is 
nothing to support an assertion that placing a device on the 
undercarriage of a car in a public parking lot falls within the scope 
of implied license.  
But the same may not be the case for an individual who 
“pitches camp” in a public area where such activity is prohibited; 
or who trespasses on another person’s property; or whose soft bag 
236. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6.
237. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018).
238. Id. at 1671.
239. Id. at 1675.
240. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402-03 (2012); United States v. Caira, 833
F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 2017);
United States v. Neugin, 958 F.3d 924, 933 n.6 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Moore-
Bush, 963 F.3d 29, 45 (1st Cir. 2020).
241. Jones, 565 U.S. at 403; Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1667.
242. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
243. Id. at 404.
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is touched in a plane’s overhead compartment while being moved.  
In these situations, the Government should be afforded the 
opportunity to demonstrate that the trespass was consistent with 
implied license, and to do so the Government will almost 
certainly emphasize the inherent unreasonableness of the 
expectation that the chattel property will be immune from such 
trespass precisely because other members of the public may do 
what the police officer did.244  If the individual citizen benefits 
from a presumption of protection, with an accordant demanding 
burden placed on the Government to establish exemption from 
this trespass-triggered presumption, a more logical balance will 
emerge rather than the per se rule adopted in Jones.245 
244. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2013).
245. There is another looming reason why it is important to consider whether the
trespass trigger for Fourth Amendment protections should be subject to this type of 
qualification: the impact on electronic data.  As noted in Jones and reinforced in Jardines, 
the trespass doctrine is limited to those items enumerated in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 n.8 (2012); see also Jardines, 
569 U.S. at 5.  To date, this does not include electronic data.  But the Court’s jurisprudence, 
coupled with the increasingly pervasive role of data in our day-to-day lives, suggests that the 
treatment of electronic data as the modern-day analogue to “papers” within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment may not be far off. Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in United 
States v. Carpenter may have been the opening salvo for such an evolution.  See United 
States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  In that case, the Court 
held that government access to cell-site location data qualified as a search.  Id. at 2220 
(majority opinion).  The majority reached this decision by applying the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test.  Id. at 2217.  According to the Court, the relatively involuntary 
nature of how such data is shared coupled with the pervasiveness of the location information 
it provides were enough to rebut the third-party doctrine and establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Id. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Gorsuch explained why he believed the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test was a fundamentally flawed touchstone for Fourth Amendment 
protections.  Id. at 2265 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  Like the criticisms frequently proffered 
by Justice Scalia, Gorsuch focused on the arbitrariness of the test.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 
2265 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting).  This arbitrariness was, according to his opinion, on full 
display in the majority holding and reasoning.  Id. at 2266-67.  As he noted, the lower courts 
had properly applied the Katz test coupled with the third-party doctrine qualifier: because 
Carpenter’s cell site date was shared with a third party, that qualifier “snuf[fed] out” his 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id. at 2267-78 (citing Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 
56 (1992)).  However, unlike the lower Courts, the majority adopted a new qualifier to the 
qualifier, concluding that even though the data had been shared with a third-party, Carpenter 
still retained a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id. at 2217 (majority opinion).For Justice 
Gorsuch, the majority approach only added a new layer of complication to the Katz test.  See 
id. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  For him, a much simpler answer seemed apparent: a 
textual approach.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267-68 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting).  After 
criticizing the third-party doctrine as inconsistent with actual societal views on the protection 
of privacy, Gorsuch suggested that treating data as the modern-day analogue of Fourth 
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Amendment papers offered a solution that was both more coherent and consistent with the 
essence of the Amendment.  Id. at 2268.  First, in rejecting the underlying rational for the 
third-party doctrine, Gorsuch hinted at the textual trespass alternative:  “Just because you 
entrust your data—in some cases, your modern-day papers and effects—to a third party may 
not mean you lose any Fourth Amendment interest in its contents.”  Id. at 2269 (emphasis 
added).  Then later in his opinion he indicated that, “It seems to me entirely possible a 
person’s cell-site data could qualify as his papers or effects under existing law.”  Id. at 2272 
(second emphasis added).Justice Gorsuch’s suggestion that data be treated as “papers” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes may be the first salvo in a barrage that will bring this approach 
from the realm of a dissent into that of a holding.  Id.  Indeed, the Court’s increasingly 
protective treatment of data suggests it is moving in just such a direction.  Cases like 
Carpenter and Riley v. California, as well as several of the concurring opinions in Jones, 
indicate a substantial concern that the pervasive use of data necessitate a new approach to its 
protection.  See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219-20 (majority opinion); see also Riley 
v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385-86 (2014); Jones, 565 U.S. at 416-17 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).  To this end, it seems significant
that it was this aspect of Jones that the Carpenter majority relied on to bolster the Court’s
holding.
Enhancing protection for electronic data shared with third parties was a thread that connected
the Carpenter majority with Justice Gorsuch.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.  For the
majority, this necessitated a qualification to the third-party doctrine; for Justice Gorsuch, a
better solution was a new approach to the characterization of data.  Id. at 2268-71 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting).  Many would agree that the concern for the protection of data is both logical
and necessary.  But if data were to be treated as “papers,” the Jones trespass doctrine might
produce an overbreadth that is just as troubling as the pervasive exposure of data to
government surveillance pursuant to the third-party doctrine.  See id.  If a trespass on that
data qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search, then arguably, no matter how widely exposed
to the public that data may be, law enforcement agents would be prohibited from accessing
and seizing that data unless they comply with the Fourth Amendment.  See generally Jones,
565 U.S. at 410 n.7.Such an application of the trespass doctrine seems as illogical as a claim
of Fourth Amendment protection for a tent pitched on a neighbor’s property without consent.
When data is shared not only with the entity providing the storage service, but with the public
generally, there seems little justification for treating government access of that data as a
search.  Id. at 409-10.  However, if treated as an analogue to papers for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, accessing and taking control of that data might qualify as the type of physical
trespass implicating the Jones doctrine.  See id. at 407-08.It may be tempting to consider
application of the plain view doctrine as a solution to this potential protective overbreadth.
After all, once shared with the public, data would be just as easily observed by government
agents.  But Jones establishes that an investigatory trespass is to be treated as a search, and
not a seizure.  See id. at 408-09. Accordingly, it is irrelevant whether the “thing” being
trespassed against has been exposed to the public.  See id. Indeed, this is exactly the argument
proffered by the government in Jones, and rejected by the Court: it was irrelevant that police
accessed Jones’ car in a public place when the placed the GPS device on the car because it
was the trespassory placement, and not the access, that qualified as a search.  Jones, 565 U.S.
at 410.  Because the plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement for a
seizure, and in no way renders a search reasonable, it provided no justification for that
trespass.  Id. at 410 n.7.  Gaining access to electronic data fully exposed to the public would
arguably implicate the same analysis, resulting in the conclusion that it is the trespassory
access, and not the seizure, that would implicate the Fourth Amendment.  See id.
In the alternative, the protection from trespass against data were treated as presumptive
instead of conclusive, a more rational balance of interests would be advanced.  Like the
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CONCLUSION 
 Resurrecting the physical trespass test for assessing when 
government action qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search 
substantially expanded the range of investigatory actions 
subjected to the Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.  By 
relegating the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test to a 
supplemental role, the Court sought to ensure what it concluded 
was the minimum protection provided by the text of the 
Amendment was not diluted by a test developed to enhance the 
scope of that protection.246  However, in seeking to prevent 
“unreasonable” outcomes resulting from application of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine, the Court may have 
set the conditions for a different type of unreasonable protective 
overbreadth, especially with regard to an individual’s “effects.”247  
Now that the mere physical touching of such effects in the course 
of an investigation qualifies as a search, it means that such 
touching triggers the requirements of the Fourth Amendment 
even when it in no way would be perceived as intruding on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.248  
The potential protective overbreadth of this resurrected 
trespass doctrine is reflected in cases involving the type of trivial 
physical trespass involved in “chalking” a car tire.249  This risk of 
illogic overbreadth may lead the Court to search for openings to 
trespass against chattel property, the government would be provided the opportunity to 
establish that the access to the data was consistent with implied license because the 
government did no more than any other member of the public might do.  See Jardines, 569 
U.S. at 8.  As Justice Gorsuch notes in his Carpenter dissent, when the government obtains 
data from a third-party repository, objective analysis suggests that data should fall within the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262-63 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting).  This is because the individual entrusting the data to the third-party rarely expect 
the third-party to disclose that data to others and certainly would not expect other individuals 
unassociated with the third-party to access that data.  Id.  However, the situation is quite 
different when the individual exposes the data to the general public.  In such situations, the 
exposure provides an objective touchstone for concluding access to the data falls within the 
scope of implied license.  See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7-9.  In short, so long as the government 
does nothing more to obtain the data than any other member of the public could do, it should 
not qualify as a search, even if the government must engage in what amounts to a physical 
trespass to obtain the data.  See id. at 8. 
246. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408-09.
247. See id. at 411 n.8.
248. See id. at 424-25 (Alito, J., concurring).
249. Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 332-33 (6th Cir. 2019).
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qualify to scope of the doctrine.  Two seeds for such qualifications 
may have already been planted: the investigatory motive element 
of Jones and the implied social license concept addressed in 
Jardines.250  How this doctrine will ultimately evolve is yet to be 
seen.  Perhaps cases like Taylor will now be the norm, requiring 
law enforcement agents to obtain a warrant or identify a relevant 
exception whenever they lay their hands on a suspect’s chattel 
property.251  Or perhaps the Court will indeed search for a more 
logical alignment between the physical trespass doctrine and the 
reasonable expectation doctrine?  If it chooses to do so, the seeds 
it has planted should provide the opportunity. 
250. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8.
251. See Taylor, 922 F.3d at 332-33.
